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by
Andrew McAlpine

Private Equity Investment in High Growth Companies: Selection & Performance

Abstract
Over the years, private equity buyout funds (PEs) have become increasingly interested in
investing in high growth entrepreneurial firms, which has traditionally been an investment
territory of venture capital funds (VCs). There is a dearth of study on how PEs invest and
perform in the so-called “growth equity” space. The purpose of this research paper is to
fill this void in the extant literature by comparing the characteristics of investments by PEs
to those by VCs in entrepreneurial companies between January 1990 and December 2014.
My research finds that both investment round size and company valuation are larger when
PEs are among active round investors. Surprisingly, companies with private equity
participation are less likely to exit successfully, however they are more likely to exit via
IPO given successful exit.
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I. Introduction
While private equity can take on many different meanings, most often the term is used to
refer to traditional private equity buyout funds (PEs). Since the onset of the second private equity
wave in the early 1990s, PEs and VCs have experienced significant growth and played a role of
increasing importance in the global capital markets. In 1991, new private equity transactions
were $10 billion but by the beginning of 2006 they had reached $500 billion. In the U.S. alone,
the number of transactions almost doubled between 2000 and 2005, while the value rose four
times (Acharya, V. V., Franks, J., & Servaes, H. 2007).
While both PEs and VCs make investments in companies not traded on a public
exchange, they differ in their respective investment objectives, styles, and territories. Over the
years, however, these differences between PE and VC investments have become somewhat
blurred. One such example is that there has been an increasing interest of PEs in high growth
entrepreneurial companies, which overlaps with investments that have traditionally been made
by VCs. Using a sample of investments in entrepreneurial companies made between January
1990 and December 2014, this paper compares the investment characteristics of PEs and VCs in
the growth equity space by looking at differences in investment round size and company
valuation when there is PE participation to when PE participation is non-existent. The second
part of this paper evaluates investment performance of PEs and VCs by analyzing the probability
of successful exit, measured through IPO or M&A under the same circumstances.
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II. Literature Review
A. Trends in the Growth Equity Market
In the last decade, there has been a massive shift from early stage investors and away
from traditional buyout funds in the private equity industry which has resulted in the emergence
of growth equity (ACGCapital, 2013). As defined by the National Venture Capital Association,
growth equity investments are made in companies that have rapidly growing revenues, positive
cash flow and often have no prior institutional investment. As the investment time horizon for
venture-backed companies has grown, so too has the need for continued financing of these
emerging growth companies in the longer run-up to their exits. PEs are increasingly interested in
investing in these founder-owned private companies with high growth potential (Evans, 2013).
Since the start of 2008, growth equity investments have totaled $12.4 billion across 616 deals
with the industry mix being very similar to that of VCs. In 2013, 40% and 5% of growth equity
deals and funding went to the Internet and healthcare sectors, respectively (CB Insights 2013).
B. Private Equity vs. Venture Capital Investments
Traditionally, the types of companies, investment styles, and capital structure of PEs
investments are very different from those of VCs. For instance, PEs typically invest across all
industries, almost always buy 100% of later-stage mature companies and use a combination of
equity and debt in their investments. They also make many fewer, but much larger investments
than do VCs. Returns by PEs are usually dependent on financial leverage. On the other hand,
VCs focus on technology companies, acquire a minority stake (less than 50%) in early-stage
(sometimes pre-revenue) companies and use only equity in their investments. They typically
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many more investments and returns are dependent on future revenue growth and profitability of
the companies in which they invest.
C. Performance and Preferred Exit Method
Previous literature has studied the performance of private equity investments by looking
at the probability of successful exit from these investments. Private equity investments are long
term in nature and are exited after several years either through an initial public offering, trade
sale, or secondary sale to other private equity funds. In evaluating the probability of a successful
exit for private equity investments made between 1980 and 2000, Sarin, Das and Jagannathan
(2002) find that the probability of exit through an IPO is roughly 20-25% and an exit via
acquisition to be 10-20%. The probability of successful exit from private equity investments is
also higher for firms in the high-tech, biotech, and medical sectors. Since that time, Strömberg
(2008) instead shows an increase in exit of private equity investments through sales to other
buyout funds, known as secondary buyouts, and a decreased number of exits through IPOs. The
most common exit route is through trade sales to another corporation, roughly 24% of
investments are exited through secondary buyouts, and IPOs account for only 13% of exits. In
the venture capital space, Arif Khursed studies the exit behavior of venture capital firms from
1990 and 2006 and finds IPO to be the preferred exit route, followed by trade sales and other exit
routes. Barry (1994) also shows that IPO is the most profitable exit route for venture capital
companies.
While the differences between investments traditionally made by PEs and VCs are wellknown, the differences between these investments in the growth equity space have been less
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studied. This paper will attempt to fill this void and identify some of those differences, with a
focus on investment size, company valuation, and exit performance.
III. Hypotheses
Based on the nature and investment style of buyout funds, it is expected that both
investment size and company valuations will be higher in investments where PE funds
participate. These relationships are expected to be even more likely in investments where PE
funds act as the lead investor. With regards to exit, similar results are expected. PEs participation
and having a PE as the lead investor is expected to increase the likelihood of successful exit.
H1N: With PEs participation, investment size and valuations will not be larger than without
PEs participation.
H1A: With PEs participation, investment size and valuations will be larger than without PEs
participation.
H2N: PEs participation will not increase the likelihood of investment exit, either through IPO
or trade sales.
H2A: PEs participation will increase the likelihood of investment exit, either through IPO or
trade sales.
IV. Empirical Analysis
A. Data and Sample
We obtain data on U.S. private equity and venture capital investments in entrepreneurial
companies between 1990 and 2014 from Thompson Financial’s VentureXpert. The database
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consists of 285,248 investor round-level observations and includes many characteristics of those
investments, including investee company name, industry, and stage at investment round, as well
as other characteristics such as round level, equity investment amount, investor fund name, and
investor fund type. Exhibits 1-4 summarize characteristics of private equity and venture capital
investments over the time horizon, and include aggregate equity funding by PEs and VCs, equity
funding by year, % of funding by company stage, and % of funding by company industry,
respectively.
The data also include post-investment characteristics of investee companies, including
variables that represent exit through IPO or trade sales. Because the focus of this paper is on the
characteristics of investments by buyout funds in entrepreneurial companies, the first data screen
eliminates any investment observations made by funds other than those characterized as either
buyout, general private equity, other private equity, or venture capital. For the analyses we refer
to the collective group of buyout funds, general private equity funds, and other private equity
funds as PEs. The second screen on the data is run on fund investor type to include only
investments made by funds characterized as independent private partnerships. Other fund types
(e.g. investment banks, fund of funds, endowment, pension, and corporate ventures) are excluded
to remove any potential effects that investor type may have on the analyses. After screening, the
population was reduced to 164,683 investor round observations. The investor round observations
are then consolidated into round level data. During the consolidation process, a new variable,
With PE, is generated to indicate whether or not a private equity fund participated in that specific
round of funding. For a given round of funding, the variable is assigned a value of 1 if one or
more private equity funds participate and a value of 0 if there is no private equity fund
participation. An additional dummy variable, PE Lead, is also generated and assumes a value of
7

1 if a private equity fund acts as the lead investor or value 0 if there is no private equity
participation or they are not the lead investor, with the lead being the investor that makes the
largest investment in the round. After running the above mentioned screens and consolidating the
data to the round level, 76,465 total investment rounds remain which will be used in the
analyses. The final sample includes 29,752 investee companies, of which 1,283 successfully
exited through IPO and 5,245 exited successfully through trade sales.
B. Summary Statistics
Table 1 provides summary statistics on the 76,465 financing rounds and compares key
characteristics of rounds when there is PE participation to rounds when there is no PE
participation. Of the total financing rounds, 10,544 rounds include PE participation and 6,469 are
led by a PE. This relates to the financing of 6,598 investee companies. A greater percentage of
financing rounds with PE participation occur at the expansion (47.3%) and later stage (22.3%)
than without PE participation. With regards to industry, more financing rounds occur in
companies operating in the non-high technology industry (23.4%), compared to only 12.7%
when there is no PE participation. Average round size and the average number of investors in a
given round are each larger when PEs participate. Investments are also more geographically
diverse, with approximately 67.3% of investment rounds occurring in firms located outside of
California.
C. Regression Analysis
Ordinary Least Squares Regressions
In analyzing round size and company valuations of PE investments, four linear
regressions are run at the investment round level. Variables are described in Appendix A. In the
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linear regressions, Ln (Round Size) and Ln (Valuation) are the dependent variables and With PE
is the independent variable of interest. In addition to controlling for company stage, company
industry, the number of investors, and the investment year, the regressions are also run with PE
Lead as the independent variable to test for robustness.
𝐿𝑛 (𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒) = ∝ + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑾𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝑷𝑬 + 𝛽2 ∗ Control Variables

(1)

𝐿𝑛 (𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) = ∝ + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝒘𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝑷𝑬 + 𝛽2 ∗ Control Variables

(2)

𝐿𝑛 (𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒) = ∝ + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑷𝑬 𝑳𝒆𝒂𝒅 + 𝛽2 ∗ Control Variables

(3)

𝐿𝑛 (𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) = ∝ + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑷𝑬 𝑳𝒆𝒂𝒅 + 𝛽2 ∗ Control Variables

(4)

In Table 2, Panel A shows the results of regressions 1 and 2 and Panel B shows the results of
regressions 3 and 4. The correlation coefficients of PE participation with round size and
company valuation are .4595 and .2666, respectively and significant at the 1% level. The
coefficients of PE as the lead investor to round size and company valuation are .5584 and .3289,
respectively and again statistically significant. The results are also economically significant. On
average, round size is approximately $1.58 million and $1.75 million larger with PE participation
and when PE leads, respectively. Also, average company valuation is approximately $1.31
million larger with PE participation and $1.39 million larger when a PE leads the round.
Probit Regressions
To analyze the performance of PE investments, four probit regressions are run. Similar to the
linear regressions above, With PE and PE Lead are the independent variables of interest.
𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑢𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑡 = ∝ + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑾𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝑷𝑬 + 𝛽2 ∗ Control Variables

(5)
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𝐼𝑃𝑂 = ∝ + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑾𝒊𝒕𝒉 𝑷𝑬 + 𝛽2 ∗ Control Variables

(6)

𝑆𝑢𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑓𝑢𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑡 = ∝ + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑷𝑬 𝑳𝒆𝒂𝒅 + 𝛽2 ∗ Control Variables

(7)

𝐼𝑃𝑂 = ∝ + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑷𝑬 𝑳𝒆𝒂𝒅 + 𝛽2 ∗ Control Variables

(8)

Tables 3 shows the results of the probit regressions on successful company exit and IPO. Panel A
shows the results of regressions 5 and 6 and Panel B shows the results of regressions 7 and 8.
With regards to exit performance, we surprisingly see a significant negative correlation of -.1356
between successful exit and PEs participation. However, while a negative correlation of -.1127 is
observed when a private equity fund leads a given round, correlation is not as strong. These
results are opposite of the expected outcome, and companies are actually less likely to exit when
a private equity fund participates. However, when looking at successful exits, slight positive
correlations exist between exiting through IPO and private equity fund participation and PE as
the lead investor. The corresponding coefficients in these two analyses are .1031 and .0666.
Companies are more likely to exit via IPO than trade sales when there is PE participation or
when a PE leads the investment round. Recall the sample includes 29,752 companies, of which
6,528 exited successfully. Approximately 80.3% of these exits occur through trade sales, with
the remaining companies exiting through IPO, consistent with Strömberg’s (2008) post-2000 exit
conclusions, that more PEs exit through trade sales and secondary buyouts as opposed to IPO.
V. Conclusion
While PEs have historically had very different investment strategies and styles from VCs,
recent trends show that more and more PEs are becoming interested in investing in
entrepreneurial companies. While past literature has studied the differences in investments by
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private equity buyout funds and venture capital funds separately, little academic research has
been done on private equity investments in the growth equity space. This paper shows some
characteristics of PE investments, as well as their performance, in what has traditionally been VC
territory.
This paper analyzes 76,465 private equity and venture capital investment rounds in
entrepreneurial companies between 1990 and 2014 and shows that investment round size as well
as company valuation at the time of the investment are positively correlated with PE
participation. These relationships are even stronger when the PE fund that participates acts as the
lead investor. With regards to exit, the sample shows that the probability of exiting through
either IPO or trade sales is approximately 21.9% which is fairly consistent with previous
literature. However, the paper finds that while successful exit is less likely when a PE
participates or leads, companies are more likely to exit through IPO, as opposed to trade sales,
when PE participation is present. A possible explanation for this may be the higher company
valuation with active PE participation, therefore reducing the feasibility of a potential trade sale,
and forcing the company to go public in order to achieve the higher valuation.
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Exhibits 1-4: PE Investments in High Growth Companies
Exhibits 1-4 show trends of PE investments in high growth companies over the data sample
period (1990-2014). Exhibits include aggregate equity funding, number of investee companies,
time series of funding by year, and percent of funding by company stage and industry.
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Exhibit 3: Funding by Company Stage
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Table 1 – Sample Characteristics of Private Equity Investments from 1990 to 2014
Our sample consists of 76,465 financing rounds in high growth companies made by private
equity funds and venture capital funds between 1990 and 2014. The table compares all financing
rounds that include PE participation to rounds in which there is no PE participation. Investment
characteristics include the number of investee companies, company stage, company industry,
average investment round size, average number of investors, and exits through IPO and trade
sales. Significance is marked with * at 10%, ** at 5%, and *** at 1%.
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Table 2 – Round Size and Valuation: With PE Participation vs. Without PE Participation
This table shows the results pertaining to round size and company valuation in financing rounds
with PEs participation. Panel A describes regressions 1 & 2 where With PE acts as the
independent variable, and Panel B describes regressions 3 & 4 where PE Lead acts as the
independent variable. Regressions with Ln (Valuation) as dependent variable exclude
observations in which company valuation data was unavailable. In each specification we control
for company stage, company industry, number of investors, and investment year. Variable
definitions can be found in Appendix A. Significance is marked with * at 10%, ** at 5%, and
*** at 1%.
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Table 3 – Company Successful: With PE Participation vs. Without PE Participation
This table shows probit regressions pertaining to company exits when PEs participate. Panel A
describes regressions 5 & 6 where With PE acts as the independent variable, and Panel B
describes regressions 7 & 8 where PE Lead acts as the independent variable. In each
specification we control for company stage, company industry, number of investors, and
investment year. Also added is variable PE-VC Syndication. Variable definitions can be found in
Appendix A. Significance is marked with * at 10%, ** at 5%, and *** at 1%.
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions
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